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Abstract: Article 3 of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International 
Contracts is the first quasi-legislative text on choice of law to allow explicitly for the 
choice of non-state law also before state courts. This paper, forthcoming in a 
Festschrift, puts the provision into a broader context, discusses their drafting 
history and particular issues involved in their interpretation. It also provides a 
critical evaluation. Article 3 does not respond to an existing need, and its 
formulation, the fruit of a compromise between supporters and opponents of 
choosing non-state law, makes the provision unsuccessful for state courts and 
arbitrators alike. 
I. Introduction 
 
Are we witnessing a revolution in choice of law for contracts? The Hague Conference 
on Private International Law is about to finalize work on so-called ‘Principles on 
Choice of Law in International Contracts’ (hereinafter called Hague Principles).1 
Formally, the novelty of the Hague Principles lies in their character as nonbinding 
soft law instead of, as has traditionally been the case at the Hague Conference, a 
Convention. Their substantive novelty is somewhat hidden, but—perhaps—just as 
important. After laying down rather uncontroversially, in Article 2(1), that “[a] 
contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties”, Article 3 introduces a 
definition of law that is novel, at least for state courts: 
 
Article 3 – Rules of Law 
Under these Principles, the law chosen by the parties may be rules of 
law that are generally accepted on an international, supranational or 
regional level as a neutral and balanced set of rules, unless the law of 
the forum provides otherwise.2 
                                                        
 Arthur Larson Professor of Law, Duke University. Thanks for invaluable advice to 
Mary Keyes, Yuko Nishitani, Geneviève Saumier and Matthias Scherer. Views and 
errors are mine. 
1 For the text, preparatory materials, and a bibliography, see 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=49.  
2 For this formulation, see Draft Commentary on the Draft Hague Principles on Choice 
of Law in International Contracts (November 2013) 18, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/princ_com.pdf. The text, together with the Draft 
Commentary, will be proposed to the Council on General Affairs and Policy in early 
2014. The previous version of Article 3 had a slightly different wording: 
 
“Rules of law,” as opposed to “law,” has traditionally been understood to include 
non-state law, and this is intended here, too. What the Hague Conference thereby 
introduces is the ability for parties to choose non-state law as the law applicable to 
their contract. Notably, such a choice is supposed to designate the applicable law in 
the sense of choice of law, not as mere incorporation into the contract.3 This is an 
important difference. If a body of rules is merely incorporated, the whole contract 
(including the incorporated rules) remains governed by a state’s law, including its 
mandatory rules. Where, by contrast, a body of rules is chosen in the sense of choice 
of law, that body becomes the applicable contract law and, at least in principle, no 
other contract law governs.4 
In international commercial arbitration, the choice of non-state law has long been 
possible (though it has not been used as much as some proponents make us 
believe.)5 For state courts, by contrast, allowing for the choice of non-state law 
represents a novelty. Choice of non-state law is excluded in practically every 
national system of choice of law.6 Before courts, the choice of non-state law has 
played virtually no role, apart from limited exceptions concerning religious law, and 
isolated decisions rejecting the validity of the choice of non-state law like sports 
rules,7 ICC rules,8 or the UPICC.9 Where it is discussed it is rejected. Attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
In these Principles, a reference to law includes rules of law that are generally 
accepted on an international, supranational or regional level as a neutral and 
balanced set of rules, unless the law of the forum provides otherwise. 
3 Geneviève Saumier and Lauro Gama Jr, ‘Non-State Law in the (Proposed) Hague 
Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts’ in Diego P. Fernández Arroyo 
& Juan José Obando Peralta (eds), El derecho internacional privado en los procesos de 
integración regional (San José, Editorial Juridica Continental, 2011) 41, 44; Jan L. 
Neels and Eesa A. Fredericks, ‘Tacit Choice of Law in the Hague Principles on Choice 
of Law in International Contracts’ (2011) 44 De Jure 101, 109. 
4 In practice, even if parties choose a law, the law that would have applied without 
the choice still plays an important role. See Ralf Michaels, ‘Die Struktur der 
kollisionsrechtlichen Durchsetzung einfach zwingender Normen’ in Ralf Michaels 
and Dennis Solomon (eds., Liber Amicorum Klaus Schurig (Munich, Sellier 2012) 
191. 
5 See Felix Dasser, ‘Mouse or Monster? Some Facts and Figures on the lex 
mercatoria’, in Reinhart Zimmermann (ed), Globalisierung und Entstaatlichung des 
Rechts (Tübingen, Mohr) 129. 
6 Ralf Michaels, ‘Preamble I’ in Stefan Vogenauer and Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds), 
Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 21, nos 49-63. The only state that allows for 
the choice of non-state law that I am aware of is Oregon; see ibid at no 58. On the 
Inter-American Convention, see infra section II.C. 
7 Swiss Federal Court, DFT 20 December 2005, 132/2005 III 285, [2006] Archiv für 
Juristische Praxis 615, also available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&id=1124&do=case. 
allow for such a choice—first in the Interamerican Conference, then in the reform of 
the European Rome I Regulation—have, so far, been unsuccessful. And indeed, it is 
not clear why we should expect there to be more interest before state courts—why 
should parties want to opt out of state-made law, but not out of state-made 
adjudication?  
In this article, I try to do three things. The first is to lay out, in relative detail, the 
context for the provision, as well as its drafting history. Art. 3 of the Hague 
Principles is the latest intervention in the debate on the choice of non-state law; it 
can be better understood against this history. My second goal is doctrinal: I attempt 
to give guidance as to some of the issues of detail that are left open by the Principles, 
while at the same time maintaining a critical stance towards them. The third goal is 
a critical evaluation. I argue that Art. 3 is emblematic of a dangerous tendency of law 
made to educate parties as to what would be good for them.  
II. Choice of Non-State Law in Transnational Codifications—
Predecessors of the Hague Principles 
The question whether non-state law can be chosen as the applicable law is, in the 
history of choice of law, a relatively recent one. That is not surprising, given that 
even party autonomy at large—the ability of the parties to choose the applicable 
law—is a very recent introduction. Party autonomy in the modern sense really 
arose only in the 19th century and became paradigmatic relatively late in the 
twentieth century.10 Still today, some legal systems, especially in Latin America, 
reject party autonomy altogether, at least in principle.11 
For a long time, discussions on party autonomy were thus, as a matter of course, 
restricted to state laws. The idea that secular non-state law could be chosen (and 
thus all state law deselected) seems to have come up in the context of discussions, 
especially among French law professors and practitioners, on a new lex mercatoria, 
which was supposed to enable either a contrat sans loi (that is a self-sufficient 
contract that requires no recourse to any other body of law than the contract 
                                                                                                                                                                     
8 Tribunale di Padova, Sezione di Este 11 January 2005, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&id=1004&do=case; for discussion, see 
Monique Luby and Sylvaine Poillot-Peruzzetto, ‘Chronique: Droit international et 
europe en’ [200 ] Jurisclasseur Périodique (La semaine juridique) 157. 
9 Tribunale di Padova (n 8) (obiter). 
10 See the extensive analysis in Yuko Nishitani, Mancini und die Parteiautonomie im 
internationalen Privatrecht (Heidelberg, Winter, 2000). 
11 See María Mercedes Albornoz, ‘Choice of Law in International Contracts in Latin 
American Legal Systems’ (2010)   Journal of Private International Law 23  Mo nica 
Sof  a Rodr  guez, ‘ l principio de la autonom  a de la voluntad y el Derecho 
Internacional Privado: asimetr  as en su reconocimiento y necesidad de 
armonizacio n legislativa en el Mercosur’ (2011) 1  Revista Cientifica de UCES 15 
112. 
itself),12 or the choice of an alleged transnational customary contract law, the so-
called lex mercatoria. 
The origins are of course complex, but it seems that we can recognize two interests 
underlying this support for non-state law. One was a professorial desire, emerging 
from a long academic tradition particularly in  urope, to “privatize” private law, by 
removing its source from the state and making it independent.13 Detachment from 
the state seems to enhance the private character of private law. In connection with 
this, it could maximize party autonomy, which is sometimes viewed as an 
unqualified good. A universal transnational private law would represent the return 
of an old dream, that of the ius commune. Diversity of laws is often viewed as 
undesirable—even by private international lawyers, who often view private 
international law as a second best solution that would be made unnecessary 
through the adoption of some universal law 
The other was a practitioners’ interest in liberating transnational contracts from 
interference by states with their mandatory laws, a market-oriented project linked 
to the rise of international arbitration as an adjudicatory system liberated from the 
state. Some practitioners support the idea of a law that is, to the farthest extent 
possible, detached from the state, and thus guarantees maximum freedom to parties, 
and maximum business to their lawyers. This latter interest in a privatized 
substantive law was always closely linked to an interest in privatized adjudication 
(arbitration). 
A. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and other Arbitration Texts 
It is indeed in international arbitration that these ideas for the choice of non-state 
law had some success in international arbitration. Art. 28 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration allows for the choice of “rules of law,” 
which is meant to comprise law other than state law.14 “Rules of law” in the same 
sense can be chosen also under many other national and nonnational arbitration 
regimes.15 Indeed, in arbitration, lex mercatoria and other non-state law have 
occasionally been selected, though not frequently.16 
                                                        
12 Léna Gannagé, ‘Le contrat sans loi en droit international privé’ (2007) 11.3 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, <http://www.ejcl.org/113/article113-
10.pdf>. 
13 See Nils Jansen and Ralf Michaels, ‘Private Law and the State. Comparative 
Perceptions, Historical Observations, and Basic Problems’, in Nils Jansen and Ralf 
Michaels (eds), Beyond the State? Rethinking Private Law (Tübingen, Mohr, 2009) 
15; also in (2007) 71 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht 345. 
14 UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (2012) 121; for discussion, see Gama and Saumier (n 3) 46 ff. 
15 Gama and Saumier ibid. 
16 See Geneviève Saumier, ‘Designating the UNIDROIT Principles in International 
Dispute Resolution’ (2012) 17 Uniform Law Review 533, 539. 
Before state courts, by contrast, the choice of lex mercatoria as applicable law has 
never been allowed.17 Certainly, one argument was that conflict of laws had 
traditionally (at least in the West and at least since the rise of the nation state) 
designated only state laws as applicable.18 However, there were also practical 
concerns having to do with the function of courts. State court decisions are 
published and may serve as precedent. This places greater requirements on 
doctrinal accuracy. And one problem with non-state law like the lex mercatoria has 
always been that its content could not be established with sufficient certainty.19 
B. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994) 
and Principles of European Contract Law (1995) 
Such uncertainty is not a problem where the non-state law in question comes in the 
form of legal rules. This was, from the beginning, a great selling point for the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC), which 
appeared, in a first edition, in 1994. Mostly, the UPICC are a text of substantive law; 
they only present themselves as a modern Restatement of the lex mercatoria, or of 
transnational commercial law.20 They also include, however, in their Preamble, rules 
on when the Principles should be applicable, including a rule that “[t]hey shall be 
applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by them.” The 
Principles of European Contract Law, whose first edition appeared in 1995, have a 
conflicts rule quite similar to the Preamble of the UPICC in their Article 1:101.21 
These are, perhaps, the earliest examples of provisions in transnational legislative 
texts that explicitly endorse the choice of non-state law without restriction to 
arbitration. Their rules on applicability have created disproportionate interest in 
scholarship—quite likely, more ink has been spilled on the single question of 
whether the Principles can be chosen as applicable law than on all of their 
                                                        
17 It is sometimes claimed that state courts recognize lex mercatoria when they 
enforce arbitral awards that have been rendered on the basis of lex mercatoria. But 
this proves little, given that arbitral awards are regularly enforced without revision 
of the applicable law. 
18 See Ralf Michaels, ‘The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, 
and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism’ (200 )  1 Wayne Law Review 1209, 
1244ff. 
19 For a similar argument as regards religious law, see Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. 
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd and others [2004] EWCA Civ 19, nos 51-52; see Adrian 
Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 386, 387f. 
20 Michael Joachim Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law: The 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (3rd edn, 2005), esp. 9 ff. 
21 Article 1:101 - Application of the Principles 
(2) These Principles will apply when the parties have agreed to incorporate 
them into their contract or that their contract is to be governed by them. 
substantive provisions combined.22 For the PECL, the question has lost some 
interest, as they merged subsequently into predecessors of an EU instrument of 
contract law.23 By contrast, for the UPICC the question remains relevant. 
The UPICC are not binding law. Their Preamble is, therefore, a rather curious rule, 
because it attempts something logically impossible: the UPICC attempt to make 
themselves applicable, just like a bootstrap.24 Nonetheless, the UPICC have had some 
success worldwide: they have occasionally been chosen as the applicable law 
(although, as far as can be seen, less frequently than their promoters suggest), and 
they are quite frequently referred to in judicial opinions.25 Their choice has not been 
held valid before any state court, however. This is so although many commentators 
have argued that the UPICC are “law” in every relevant regard, and must therefore 
be a possible object of choice. But this has always been a non sequitur: even if the 
UPICC are indeed law in the sense of legal theory, this is not binding for the sense of 
the term “law” in a choice-of-law rule. Here, the matter is one of statutory 
interpretation, and confinement to state law is usually in accordance with legislative 
intent. 
C. Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International 
Contracts (1994) 
The first treaty that allows, according to some, for the choice of non-state law as the 
applicable law before state courts was the Inter-American Convention on the Law 
Applicable to International Contracts, also called the Mexico Convention. Non-state 
law was actively pushed by some participants in the negotiations, in particular Fritz 
Juenger. It does indeed appear in the Convention, though not in direct connection to 
party choice. Thus, Art. 9(2)(2) requires the judge to look also to “general principles 
of law” when the parties have not chosen a law, but this hardly suggests that parties 
should be able to choose such general principles. In addition, Art. 10 gives a role to 
guidelines, customs, principles of international commercial law and commercial 
usage and practice, but that role is merely supplementary.26 
                                                        
22 A comprehensive bibliography would be impossible. For a great number of 
publications, see the bibliography for the Preamble of the UPICC at www.unilex.info, 
and the bibliography in Vogenauer and Kleinheisterkamp (n 6) 1201. 
23 See  ric Clive,’The Lasting Influence of the Lando Principles’ in Michael Joachim 
Bonell et al (eds), Liber Amicorum Ole Lando (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2012) 69, 71. For a 
(critical) perspective on the trajectory from EPCL to European Sales Law, see Horst 
 idenmüller et al, ‘The Proposal for a Regulation on a Common  uropean Sales Law: 
Deficits of the Most Recent Textual Layer of  uropean Contract Law’ (2012) 1  
Edinburgh Law Review 301. 
24 See Ralf Michaels, ‘Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation – Zu Anwendbarkeit 
und Geltung allgemeiner Vertragsrechtsprinzipien’ (1998)  2 Rabels Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 580, 613. 
25 See Michaels (n 6) nos 88-117. 
26 Similarly now Articles 13(4) and 51of the new Uruguayan Code for Private 
International Law. See Didier Opertti Badán and Cecilia Fresnedo de Aguirre, ‘The 
Latest Trends in Latin American Private International Law: The Uruguayan 2009 
Where the Convention talks about party autonomy, by contrast, non-state law does 
not seem to be available. Article 7(1)(1) reads simply: ‘The contract shall be 
governed by the law chosen by the parties.’ Allowing parties to choose the 
applicable law was already a novelty for many countries in Latin America, where 
party autonomy is still viewed by many with suspicion.27 Nonetheless, some 
commentators suggest that the provision is even more far-reaching: for them, “Law” 
has been read to include non-state law.28 This would be rather unusual; in most 
other choice-of-law statutes, “law” is restricted to the law of states, and Article 17 
defines law as “the law current in a State, excluding rules concerning conflict of 
laws.”. The Spanish version has “derecho” instead of “ley,” which could suggest a 
different meaning, but this seems by no means conclusive. In practice, this may 
matter little, since the Convention has been ratified only by Mexico and Venezuela.29 
                                                                                                                                                                     
General Law on Private International Law’ (2009) 11 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 305; eid., ‘El derecho internacional en el Proyecto de Ley general 
de derecho internacional privado del Uruguay—Una prima aproximación’ in Jürgen 
Basedow, Diego P Fernández Arroyo, José Antonio Moreno Rodríguez (eds), Cómo se 
codifica hoy el derecho comercial internacional? (Asunción, CEDEP/Thomson 
Reuters/La Ley Paraguaya, 2010) 385, 390-91, 410 et passim. According to Cecilia 
Fresnedo de Aguirre, ‘Party Autonomy—A Blanc Cheque?’ (2012) Uniform Law 
Review    ,    , Article 13(4) reaches “the same conclusion” as Article 3 of the 
Hague Principles, which seems far-fetched, given that Article 13(4) does not deal 
with party choice. 
27 Supra n 11. 
28 Friedrich K. Juenger, ‘The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts  Some Highlights and Comparisons’ (1994) 42 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 381, 392  id, ‘Contract Choice of Law in the Americas’ 
(1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 19 , 204  Gonzalo Parra-
Aranguren, ‘The Fifth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private 
International Law, Mexico City, 14–18 March, 1994’ in Alegr  a Borra s et al (eds), E 
Pluribus Unum: Liber Amicorum Georges AL Droz (The Hague et al, Kluwer Law 
International, 199 ) 299, 308  Jose  Luis Siqueiros, ‘Los Principios de UNIDROIT y la 
Convencio n Interamericana sobre el derecho aplicable a los contratos 
internacionales’ in Instituto de Investigaciones Jur  dicas (ed), Contrata     
internacional: Comentarios a Los Principios sobre los Contratos Comerciales 
Internacionales del UNIDROIT (Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
1998) 217, 227; for a constitutional argument, see Lauro Gama,           
                                                                             
Jurisdicao (Rio de Janeiro, Renovar, 2006) 434-8; for extensive discussion, see Sven 
Schilf, Allgemeine Vertragsgrundregeln als Vertragsstatut (Tübingen, Mohr, 2005) 
347–359; José Antonio Moreno Rodriguez and María Mercedes Albornoz, 
‘Reflections on the Mexico Convention in the Context of the Preparation of the 
Future Hague Instrument on International Contracts’ (2011) Journal of Private 
International Law 491, 502-7. 
29 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-56.html.  
D. Rome I Regulation (2008) 
For some time, it looked as though the choice of non-state law would become 
available in a major transnational text. In a Green Paper of 2003, the European 
Commission considered enabling parties to choose ‘general principles of law’ as 
applicable law.127 The background to the rather surprising proposal lay in other 
areas of European law: At the time, there were discussions about an optional 
Community instrument, which, to be effective, had to be electable. It was felt that 
a private international law text should formulate this possibility in a more abstract 
manner. Reactions to the proposal were mixed: While many academics were 
positive, professional associations and practitioners remained, by and large, more 
hesitant.
 30
 Nonetheless, a 2005 proposal for a new Regulation provided, in the 
first sentence of its Art 3(2), that ‘[t]he parties may also choose as the applicable 
law the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognized 
internationally or in the Community’.31 It was not, however, adopted in the final 
version of the Regulation.
32
 Recital 13 merely states that such general principles 
can be incorporated into the contract by means of freedom of contract under the 
applicable (state) law. A reason for the change of heart may well have been that 
the question had lost much relevance, once it was clear that a Europeanized 
contract law could be made applicable by other means.
33
 
III. The Genesis of Article 3 of the Hague Principles 
In result, then, attempts so far to introduce a choice of non-state law have been 
unsuccessful, at least as regards courts. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration and similar texts apply only in arbitration. The Mexico 
Convention contains no clear endorsement of the choice of non-state law and in any 
event has been largely unsuccessful so far. The Preamble of the UPICC has garnered 
much academic support but no followers among legislators or courts. The Rome I 
Proposal in the relevant parts did not become law. 
                                                        
30 All reactions are available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/ 
consulting_public/rome_i/news_ summary_rome1_en.htm. 
31 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 final (15 December 
200 )  . See Zheng Sophia Tang, ‘Non-state law in party autonomy – a European 
perspective' (2012) 5 International Journal of Private Law 22, 26. 
32 See Rome I Regulation, Art. 3(1) and recital 13; Tang (n 31) 27. 
33 See now Sixto A Sánchez-Loreno, ‘Common  uropean Sales Law and Private 
International Law: Some Critical Remarks’ (2013) 9 Journal of Private International 
Law 191; Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Choice of C SL and Conflict of Laws’ in Gerhard 
Dannemann and Stefan Vogenauer (eds), The Common European Sales Law in 
Context—Interactions with English and German Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2013) 21. 
The Hague Principles start very much where the unsuccessful attempts for the 
Rome I Regulation left off. They represent another attempt to introduce the choice 
of non-state law in an international instrument. In order to understand the role that 
non-state law plays in them, it may be helpful to look in some more detail at the 
genesis of their Article 3, in the context of the general nature of the Hague Principles 
A. Challenges for the Hague Conference  
The Hague Conference on Private International Law, founded in 1893, is the most 
venerated institution for the international unification of private international law. In 
one way, it is a very successful organization—it counts 75 members from all five 
continents (74 states and the European Union), and many of its Conventions have 
been very successful. In another way, however, the Conference and its preferred 
instrument, the Convention, are in a crisis. 
This crisis has several aspects. One is the fact that membership in the Conference 
has greatly increased; it now comprehends states with vastly different legal and 
economic conditions. A related problem is that member states are increasingly 
hesitant to ratify Conventions. In addition, the Hague Conference is no longer the 
unquestioned leader of private international law developments, now that the 
European Union has become very active in the field. 34 
And although the Hague Conference has had success in the area of administrative 
coordination especially in family law, it has never been very successful with choice-
of-law regimes. Choice of law for contracts is a prime example. The Hague Principles 
are not the first project of the Hague Conference devoted to choice of law in 
contracts. Conventions of 1955 and 1986 already addressed the law applicable to 
contracts for the international sale of goods.35 The 1955 Convention went into force 
in 1964, the 1986 Convention never did. Neither of them addressed the choice of 
non-state law. Chances for ratification of a general choice of law convention, 
considered in the 1980s, were considered slim (not least because the EC member 
states had just concluded the Rome Convention and saw little need for a global 
treaty); the project was abandoned.36 At the same time that the European Union has 
a comprehensive code on choice of law for contracts in the Rome I Regulation (albeit 
one in which, as discussed, non-state law cannot be chosen), international 
unification through hard law seems nearly impossible. Even the Exclusive Choice-of-
                                                        
34 See Jürgen Basedow, ‘Was wird aus der Haager Konferenz für Internationales 
Privatrecht?’ in Thomas Rauscher and Heinz-Peter Mansel (eds), Festschrift für 
Werner Lorenz zum 80. Geburtstag (Munich, Sellier, 2001) 463; Michael Traest, 
‘Development of a European Private International Law and the Hague Conference’ 
(2003) 5 Yearbook of Private International Law 223. 
35 See Ole Lando, ‘The 19   and 198  Hague Conventions on the Law Applicable to 
the International Sale of Goods’ (1993)  7 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht 155. 
36 Hans van Loon, ‘Feasibility study on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 
Preliminary Document   of December 1983’ in Hague Conference of Private 
International Law: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Session, vol. I (1983) 98. 
Court Convention, which is, in its content, fairly uncontroversial has so far proven 
very hard to even ratify, let alone implement.37 
B. Principles as a Response 
The combination of these challenges is what led the Hague Conference to adopt a 
new form for their contracts project: soft instead of hard law, principles instead of a 
convention. The UPICC provided a model in this regard.38 Several years ago, Herbert 
Kronke, then director of UNIDROIT, floated the idea of principles of choice of law, 
though what he had in mind at the time was a more comprehensive project.39 The 
Hague Conference has now taken up this idea.40 On recommendation by the 
Council,41 its new text on choice of law in contracts comes as a non-binding text, 
notably as Principles, rather than as a Draft Convention. Their Preamble, which is 
modeled closely on that of the UPICC, suggests that they can be used as a model for 
legislation, or, by courts or arbitrators, as a supplementary source for 
interpretation. This suggests that the Hague Preamble does not aim to fulfil the third 
of the functions of the UPICC, namely its Restatement function—to serve, as an 
accurate description of the current state of the law.42 Their main function is rather 
to serve as a model for lawmaker (predominantly perhaps in Latin America).43 In 
addition, they are supposed to play a supplementary role in the interpretation of 
existing regimes. Unlike the UPICC, the Hague Principles do not suggest that they 
themselves can be chosen by the parties (in line with the general opposition to 
allowing parties to choose the applicable choice-of-law rules). 
The advantages should be obvious: Principles do not have to go through a difficult 
ratification process; instead, it can be hoped that they can influence legislators and 
                                                        
37 See Marta Pertegás and Louise  llen Teitz, ‘Prospects for the Convention of 30 
June 200  on Choice of Court Agreements’ in Permanent Bureau of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (ed), A Commitment to Private 
International Law—Essays in Honour of Hans van Loon (Cambridge et al, Intersentia, 
2013) 465. 
38 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference, Consolidated Version of Preparatory 
Work Leading to the Draft Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International 
Contracts (Prel Doc No 1, Oct 2012) no 7; Neels and Fredericks (n 3) 102. 
39 Herbert Kronke, ‘Most Significant Relationship, Governmental Interests, Cultural 
Identity, Integration: “Rules” at Will and the Case for Principles of Conflict of Laws’ 
(2004) 9 Uniform Law Review 467. 
40 They are not the only such project. For another project, see Spyridon V Bazinas, 
‘Towards Global Harmonization of Conflict-of-Laws Rules in the Area of Secured 
Financing: The Conflict-of-Laws Recommendations of the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Secured Transactions’ in Essays in Honour of Hans van Loon (n 37) 1. 
41 Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council on General Affairs and 
Policy of the Conference (31 March – 2 April 2009), and in particular "Choice of law 
in international contracts", p 1.  
42 For this function of the UPICC (and its limitations), see Michaels, Preamble I (n 6) 
nos 3-4.  
43 Consolidated Version (n 38) no 8. 
courts in a more informal way. Their reception need not happen wholesale; 
lawmakers may pick and choose the provisions they like. In theory, their content 
can be changed more easily (although experience with the UPICC suggest that such 
changes will be rare). 
However, these advantages come with disadvantages. The most obvious 
disadvantage arises from their nonbinding character: unlike a Convention, the 
Hague Principles have no binding force; they must convince before they can become 
relevant. Of course, this is true also for Conventions. But Conventions at least carry 
the weight that they have been negotiated by delegates of the ratifying country. It is 
not clear that a state would be more likely to adopt a text if it does not come as a 
Treaty. 
A more pressing potential disadvantage concerns the negotiating process: Whereas 
negotiators drafting a Convention with a view towards ratification will, to a large 
extent, have the positions of potential ratifiers in mind, negotiators of a nonbinding 
instrument may feel less constricted. They are not subject to instructions or 
expectations to the same degree. As a consequence, they may hope that the quality 
of the text they agree on will alone suffice to make them attractive. This may 
occasionally be the case. Sometimes, legal rules are successful precisely because 
they are developed without direct political pressure from constituents. But the 
danger exists, instead, that negotiators will veer too far from the mainstream to 
produce a text that is accepted. 
The difference in processes should not be exaggerated in this case. For work on the 
Hague Principles, the Hague Conference followed a semi-official procedure and 
organized the Special Commission as a diplomatic conference. Representatives from 
several governments were given relatively detailed instructions, and the EU 
representative in particular opposed Article 3 with vehemence. Still one may 
speculate that a government should be more in the content of a treaty it plans to 
enter into than of Principles that have no binding character. 
 
C. Drafting History of Article 3 
All of this seems especially relevant as concerns the drafting of Article 3. The 
question whether non-state law could be chosen must have been on the mind of 
negotiators from the beginning, in light of experiences with the Rome I Regulation 
drafting process.44 Nonetheless, it was not in the forefront from the beginning. 
The question of non-state law first appears in official materials of the Hague 
Conference in a feasibility study drafted in 2007.45 The study suggests the question 
should be taken on because the choice of non-state law “has for long played an 
important role in arbitration but is also of growing importance in court 
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Carried out and Conclusions (Follow-Up Note) (Prel Doc No 5, February 2008), 
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd05e2008.pdf. 
proceedings.”46 No evidence is provided for this finding. Indeed, although the Hague 
Conference had sent out questionnaires earlier in 2007 to member states and 
stakeholders whether and in what way uniform rules on choice of law in 
international contracts should be made, the questionnaires did not contain a 
question as to whether there was any need to choose non-state law.47 Consequently, 
the question was not addressed in responses. 
A later study suggests, appropriately, the Working Group should “take into 
consideration both the rules applied by State courts and specific international 
arbitration rules.”48 That would suggest making a distinction between arbitration 
(where “rules of law” can be chosen) and courts (where only “law” can be 
selected).49 The Working Group, however, took a different path. After an extensive 
discussion in its first meeting in January 2010, it established a subgroup to address 
the question, consisting of Lauro Gama (author of a very comprehensive book on the 
UPICC and subsequently a member of the UPICC working group)50, Geneviève 
Saumier (a leading private international law expert at McGill), and, at different 
times, Emmanuel Darankoum from Montréal and José Moreno Rodriguez from 
Paraguay.51 The subgroup produced two reports which remain unpublished but 
form the basis of two articles.52 It found that non-state law could be chosen, at the 
moment, only in commercial arbitration.53 Nonetheless, the subgroup advocated 
neither this solution nor another, namely to say nothing and leave the definition of 
“law” to further development. Instead, it supported a third option that was 
approved by the Working Group and ultimately made its way into the Hague 
Principles—to allow the choice of non-state law regardless of the mode of 
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parties to choose not only national laws but also transnational or a-national rules or 
principles to govern the dispute. This has for long played an important role in 
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50 Gama (n 28). 
51 Gama and Saumier (n 3) 44 fn 6. 
52 Gama and Saumier (n 3) (see especially 44); Saumier (n 16) 540ff (see especially 
541 note 32). 
53 Gama and Saumier (n 3) 45. 
adjudication.54 The main reasons given were that no meaningful difference exists 
between courts and arbitrators or between the choice of state law and that of non-
state law, and that allowing for the choice of non-state law enhances party 
autonomy.55  
This suggestion was successful. Although parties in practice rarely choose non-state 
law—or, rather, precisely in order to overcome this situation56—the Working Group 
decided, after further discussions, to allow parties to choose “the law or rules of law 
governing their contract”.57 The formulation mirrored the UNCITRAL Model Law 
and thus allow for the choice of non-state law, but was meant to be available also to 
state courts. The ability to choose non-state law was justified with the need of the 
parties for specific rules and for stabilization of the parties’ expectations. The aim 
was to make the choice as broad as possible. The report also suggests that “the draft 
Hague Principles not include any express definition or limitation of the term “rules 
of law”, as this provides the greater support for party autonomy.”58 Moreover, 
unlike the Draft Rome I Regulation, the Working Group explicitly rejected an 
additional criterion of legitimacy or international or regional recognition. The only 
restriction was that the chosen law had to be a body of rules.59  
The draft thus provided, for the first time, for the choice of non-state law without 
significant restrictions. This apparently went too far for members of the Hague 
Conference. According to one participant, non-state law was “the most controversial 
issue at the session of the Special Commission”60 (which is not surprising, given that 
the other provisions are mostly well within the mainstream) and was discussed “for 
the better part of the week.”61 In the end, a compromise was reached: the choice of 
“rules of law” remained possible but was subjected to a number of qualifiers: these 
rules must be “generally accepted on an international, supranational or regional 
level as a neutral and balanced set of rules”. The Special Commission apparently 
demanded these qualifiers “to afford greater certainty as to what parties can 
designate as rules of law governing their contractual relationship”, though in reality 
the qualifiers seem to act more as substantive restrictions than as clarifiers, as I 
discuss in the next section. In addition, Article 3 now suggests that rules of law can 
be chosen only “unless the law of the forum provides otherwise.” This seems a 
                                                        
54 Gama and Saumier (n 3) 50. 
55 Gama and Saumier (n 3) 50-52. I discuss these arguments in section V.B. 
56 See Gama and Saumier (n 3) 64-65. 
57 Available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/contracts_rpt_nov2010e.pdf, 
 1 (Preamble), 2 (Formulation of the Principle of Party Autonomy in General). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/contracts_rpt_june2011e.pdf, 3. 
60 Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International 
Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments’ (2013)  1 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 873, 892. 
61 Symeonides (n 60) 893. 
rather unnecessary clarification, given that the Hague Principles are not binding 
anyway.62  
After the session, the Working Group redrafted the provision and also drafted 
commentary, in which the drafting responsibilities for Article 3 were taken by Lauro 
Gama and Geneviève Saumier.63 Because the final version differs significantly from 
the draft version of the Working Group, the draft commentary differs significantly 
from the 2011 policy document. The draft commentary is to be discussed and 
finalized in 2014. 
IV. Particular Issues 
With the changes introduced by the Special Commission, Article 3 has become 
significantly more complex than it was in its earlier formulation by the Working 
Group. This makes a closer look at individual requirements of the rule appropriate. 
A. ‘Rules of law’ 
What is actually meant by “rules of law”? Obviously, law does not mean state law 
here, as a positivistic understanding would have it.64 Rules of law are, presumably, 
legal norms formulated by so-called “formulating agencies”, 65  be those 
intergovernmental (like UNIDROIT or UNCITRAL) or academic (like the Lando 
group that formulated the PECL) or representative of certain industries (like the 
International Chamber of Commerce). 
Although “rules of law” is meant to designate non-state law, not all non-state law 
can qualify as “rules of law”. Mere principles of law are not rules. (UPICC and P CL 
however, although they carry the title of Principles, actually consist of rules.) Lex 
mercatoria for example, as an amalgam of rules and principles and maxims, does not 
qualify. However, it seems appropriate that a choice of lex mercatoria can often be 
reinterpreted as a choice of the UPICC according to their Preamble.66  
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65 On the idea of formulating agencies, see Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping 
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Another type of law that creates problems are most religious or customary laws, 
because they do not come in the form of rules.67 Western courts have indeed 
expressed discomfort with a duty to interpret religious law like Islamic law, the 
content of which is often unclear.68 At the same time, it would be quite unfortunate 
if religious law could not be chosen, especially given that this may be the only kind 
of non-state law that could actually matter before state courts. Religious actors 
choose religious law not infrequently for their business transactions;69 for them, 
access to courts might be attractive if they could maintain the choice of religious 
law. In this regard, a broad interpretation of the term appears advisable. 
B. ‘Set of Rules’ 
In addition, Art. 3 requires that the rules of law come as a “set of rules.” This has 
been explained as requiring that they are “fairly complete and comprehensive”.70 
What does that mean? Is the CISG fairly complete and comprehensive? It covers only 
sales law, and even here it has gaps. Are the UPICC fairly complete and 
comprehensive? 71 They have gaps, too. Even more problematic are rules like the 
Hague-Visby Rules, which cover only certain sub-themes of contract law. The Draft 
Commentary asks that sets of rules “allow for the resolution of common contract 
problems in the transborder context.”72 But are not uncommon contract problems at 
least as important? Should a chosen law not resolve, potentially at least, all 
problems? 
Notably, a similar restriction does not exist in arbitration, where the “rules of law” 
to be chosen can, in theory, be individual rules. The idea behind requiring a “set of 
rules” for the Hague Principles may have been that non-state law should be chosen 
only where it bears some similarity to state law (which is comprehensive), and that 
parties should not be allowed to pick and choose individual rules. But both concerns 
appear unwarranted. The idea behind sectoral codifications is not to achieve 
comprehensiveness beyond the respective sector, and not even necessarily within it. 
Such non-state laws will always govern in combination with another law (frequently 
the law of a state, designated through a choice-of-law rule). But that is not at all 
unusual in contract law. Notably, parties can even choose different laws for different 
parts of their contract in a process called dépeçage; the Hague Principles, which 
allow for this in their Art. 2(2),73 only adopt a possibility that is already widely 
available. A clever use of dépeçage already allows parties to pick and choose 
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individual rules from different legal systems. Restricting choice of non-state law to 
“sets of rules” thus seems, in the face of Art. 2(2), not to be a significant restriction. 
C. ‘Neutral and Balanced’ 
More important is another restriction: chosen sets of rules of law must be “neutral 
and balanced”. A similar criterion had been discussed for the Rome I Regulation. But 
what does this mean? Does it mean a substantive standard? The Draft Commentary 
suggests as much: the designated rules ‘should not advantage one party’s interests 
over the other’.74 That would be more than awkward: according to what standard 
should an adjudicator make this assessment? For example, the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) has been criticized by some as 
being either too seller-friendly or too buyer-friendly, and thus not balanced.75 For its 
legal treatment under existing law, this matters little: as an international law 
Convention, the CISG applies automatically within its scope unless the parties 
excplicitly exclude it. A perceived lack of balance matters only in practice insofar as 
it may bring parties to opt out of the CISG. If, however, balance becomes a criterion 
for electability, one can expect contestations. Even the UPICC, perhaps the clearest 
example of a non-state text that the drafters have in mind, are not obviously 
balanced; they share this with the CISG. 
More fundamentally, it is not clear at all why the parties, whose autonomy is 
otherwise emphasized, must be restricted to the choice of a balanced law at all. For 
the substantive terms of contracts, no such restriction exists; what we find instead, 
typically, is a far less demanding requirement of “good faith and fair dealing.” When 
parties choose the law of a state, that state law need not be neutral and balanced 
either, up to the limits of internationally mandatory rules and ordre public. It would 
be understandable to demand that non-state law, to be chosen, be as balanced as 
state law; it is not clear at all why higher requirements make any sense. 
All of this suggests that the “neutral and balanced” requirement must be understood 
in a formal, not a substantive way. That means: non-state law can be chosen only 
when it has been formulated by an agency that is, with regard to the parties, 
neutral.76 Even this restriction finds no similarity in the choice of state law, where 
parties can and frequently do choose one party’s home law. And it is hard to 
operationalize. The Draft Commentary requires that the body “represents diverse 
legal, political and economic perspectives”.77 This confuses diversity with neutrality. 
Does the ICC represent diverse perspectives? (Or, more practically—will there not 
be dispute over whether any body really fulfils this requirement?) 
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Even more strangely, the Special Commission asks that the body of laws should ‘not 
[be] imposed by market power.’78 But is not every contract term, including every 
chosen law, a function of market power (or, more precisely: bargaining power)? Are 
not the drafters of nonstate law also competitors in the market for laws, and are not 
their products more or less successful as a function of their market power? 
(UNIDROIT has greater power than the Académie des Privatistes Européens, to 
name just one example.) This criterion appears unworkable. 
A more appropriate criterion of neutrality would be to ask that an agency could 
claim to represent either all parties (like the ICC with regard to commercial actors) 
or none (like UNIDROIT). This leads to a relative concept of neutrality: Islamic law 
becomes neutral and balanced as between Muslims79 but loses that character as 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. 
D. ‘Generally accepted’ 
Another requirement is included, again one known from the European discussions: 
the chosen law must be “generally accepted”. This is a vague standard. Whose 
recognition matters for this? And how much recognition is required? The criterion is 
met most easily by laws that are already binding, like the CISG,80 which have been 
accepted by the treaty partners and by numerous courts, even though even the CISG 
is not “generally accepted” in one sense: parties still regularly opt out of its use. 
Beyond the CISG, the UPICC are usually named as the most obvious candidate.81 But 
in what way are they “generally accepted”? They are certainly not accepted by 
courts, which never apply them, except by comparative reference. We find more 
acceptance among arbitrators, but acceptance only by one type of adjudication can 
certainly not be “general”.  
More importantly, again, it is not at all clear what general acceptance should actually 
accomplish. Why is acceptance by the parties not enough, coupled with a 
supervisory control by the adjudicator? The problem is one of chicken and egg: as 
long as non-state law cannot be chosen it cannot be generally accepted, and as long 
as it is not generally accepted it cannot, under the new standard, be chosen. This 
may not be a problem for the UPICC, given the extensive debate that has occurred, 
but it is a problem for other, newer texts. 
E. ‘International, Supranational or Regional Level’ 
Even stranger is the requirement that general acceptance must occur on a 
international, supranational or regional level. Maybe, the Hague Conference had in 
mind that international contracts require a law that somehow transcends locality. 
But ordinary party autonomy regularly goes to state laws that are, by definition, not 
accepted on a general or regional level. Why must non-state law then be 
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80 Draft Commentary, no. 3.5. 
81 Draft Commentary, no. 3.6. 
transnational? Why should parties be allowed to choose the UPICC but not one of 
their models, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)? What does supranational or 
regional acceptance guarantee that is not already inherent in general acceptance? 
The Code of European Contract Law by the Académie des Privatistes Européens82 
was drafted closely on a project for an English Code, the so-called McGregor 
Code83—does it make sense to draw a distinction between them? Perhaps, the 
requirement should be read to simply mean wide acceptance—which could then 
include also local law as long as such law is widely recognized, like the UCC.  
F. Filling Gaps 
So far, these have all been interpretative problem. A more fundamental problem 
arises from the fact that all non-state sets of rules, other than state laws, are 
incomplete—they cover certain areas of the law, but not all. The CISG, for example, 
deals only with sale of goods contracts. The UPICC deal only with contract law and 
do not even extend to every aspect of it. Choice of non-state law is thus, almost 
necessarily, incomplete. 
What follows? The draft commentary suggests, pragmatically, that parties should 
choose an additional law to fill the ensuing gaps.84 This is of course possible, 
although it seems to reduce, significantly, the value of choosing non-state law. But it 
points to a more fundamental problem with the choice of non-state law: such choice 
is always, literally, choice of “rules of law”, not of a governing “law”. This may make 
sense in international arbitration, where the decision-making process, aimed at 
justice in the individual case, is often based on individual rules, and where 
mandatory rules can still often be entirely avoided. Before state courts it appears 
fairly unattractive. State courts already refer to individual rules of the UPICC 
frequently, though for comparative purposes rather than as actually applicable 
law.85 It is not clear why the choice of a non-state law like the UPICC should be 
attractive if it requires the choice or determination of another contract law.  
V. Evaluation 
A. The Rule 
All in all, Article 3 appears as a rather problematic provision in what should 
otherwise be a rather uncontroversial legal document. A provision allowing for the 
choice of non-state law is a bold novelty. Whether such a provision is a good idea is 
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another matter. Given the relatively low interest that parties have shown, so far, in 
the choice of non-state law (with the exception of religious law), it is not clear that it 
was worth including such a provision. Other than for the Rome II Regulation (which 
had to address, at the time, the potential of an optional contract code), there seems 
to have been no real need for such a provision. This is so especially for a rule that 
allows for the choice only of “rules of law” and thereby excludes, in all likelihood, 
those areas of non-state law that would potentially be most relevant, especially 
Jewish and Islamic law. 
Still, a provision like the one originally proposed by the Working Group, that laid out 
no additional requirements for what could be chosen as rules of law would at least 
have made analytical sense. But the additional requirements, added at the request of 
the Special Commission, have made a problematic rule far worse. They may have 
been aimed at achieving more certainty, but, in the apt words of one (not so subtle) 
early commentator, “almost every word drips with uncertainty.”86 They surpass 
what is required from state law (which need not be neutral and balanced) and thus 
reinforce, albeit in an ad hoc way, what was to be overcome—the arbitrary 
distinction between state and non-state law. Their introduction means that Article 3 
is now too narrow for international arbitration (which mostly does not have similar 
requirements). At the same time it is likely too broad and also too imprecise for 
states (which so far do not allow for the choice of non-state law at all). All in all, the 
requirements express an understandable uneasiness with the choice of non-state 
law. But instead of either opposing the choice of non-state law altogether, or 
suppressing the concerns and trusting adjudicators to find appropriate criteria, the 
Special Commission found a compromise that cannot satisfy either side of the 
discussion.  
The Hague Conference, by including Article 3 in the Hague Principles, takes a 
gamble. The hope is that the authority of the Hague Conference can finally bring 
about what earlier attempts failed at—to bring state courts to allow parties to 
choose non-state law. However, the gamble is not without risk. The novelty of the 
provision may well mean that Article 3 garners disproportionate attention in 
discussions, at the expense of the other provisions, which might well yield general 
assent. (Experience with the UPICC where the Preamble has been discussed more 
than all other provisions combined, might suggest as much.) Moreover, Article 3 
might well cause lawmakers to trust the entire Hague Principles less; they might 
consider them more uncontroversial than they otherwise are. 
B. The Arguments 
With Article 3, then, the Working Group added a provision that is deeply 
problematic for the law and creates a great risk for the acceptance of the Hague 
Principles, while at the same time not responding to an actual practical need. This 
makes it worthwhile to look at the arguments brought forward. 
One argument for the new rule can be found in a certain ideological commitment. 
The Principles, following the explicit mandate from the Council on General Affairs 
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and Policy,87 formulate the maximization of party autonomy as an explicit goal. And 
indeed, allowing the choice of non-state law obviously extends party autonomy. But 
it is not clear why the task of a legal text on party autonomy should be to promote 
party autonomy.88 Robert Wai has pointed out, quite elegantly, that the task of 
private international law is not to promote enforcement of the will of the parties, 
but instead to lay down both the scope and the limits of such enforcement.89 One 
may well think that the balance needs to be struck in a different way, but that a 
balance is necessary seems to be out of question, and thus the mere finding that 
allowing choice of non-state law enhances party autonomy is simply not enough. 
A second argument concerns the alleged similarity between state law and non-state 
law. Much has been made of this alleged similarity in scholarly discussions.90 
Expanding the notion of law to non-state law is fashionable; it is often called the 
more “modern” position,91 which alone seems to make it superior. Frequently, 
scholars point out that at least some non-state laws have great parallels with state 
law. Both arguments are debatable. But even regardless of these theoretical 
arguments, it should be quite obvious that non-state law and state law are not 
similar from a practical position. Members of the Hague group suggest that the 
process of choosing non-state law would not be very different from the widely 
accepted process of choosing state law.92 But there exists an obvious difference. The 
term “rules of law” is sometimes viewed as mere code for non-state law, but the 
term makes sense quite literally: rules of law, like the UPICC, are different from 
systems of law, like state law. Where state law is chosen, the result is a relatively 
comprehensive set of rules and principles and a relatively high degree of internal 
consistency (created by highest courts). Where rules of law are chosen, the result is, 
necessarily, an incomplete body of law. Practically, the choice of rules of law always 
makes it necessary to apply other rules, too. It may be possible to devise ways for 
how to do this. But the universal need to do so represents a fundamental difference 
to state law that is hard to overlook. 
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This argument does not seem crucial in arbitration, and therefore a third argument 
brought forward in favor of Article 3 lies in the equation of courts and arbitrators. It 
is suggested that ‘in most legal systems arbitration now carries the same legitimacy 
and effectiveness as the judicial dispute resolution system’.93 This is a bold 
statement,94 but legitimacy is not the most pressing issue. Even if it is true that 
courts and arbitrators are similarly legitimate, it by no means follows that courts 
and arbitrators should use the same rules. Notably, the use of ‘rules of law’ in 
arbitration is, comparatively, less dramatic than before courts.95 Even where the 
arbitrator is required to apply the law, and cannot determine relevant issues on 
the sole strength of the contract terms, the legal argument on which arbitrators 
and counsel rely is often quite different from what one sees in state courts: 
counsel and arbitrators frequently argue on the basis of individual rules, 
sometimes drawn from different legal systems, and from uniform rules such as 
UPICC, which strictly speaking may not be applicable at all, but can be key to 
bolstering a legal argument based on the applicable law, or, to the contrary, to 
persuading the arbitral tribunal that the opponent’s argument based on the 
applicable law leads to a result that is incompatible with other laws or 
instruments. The force of such indirect legal arguments is naturally greater 
before an international arbitral tribunal than in a court of law. In many cases, 
one or more arbitrators will not be qualified in the applicable law. If the solution 
found in the applicable law does not meet the expectations of said arbitrators 
they will be inclined to find a solution they find more appropriate, interpreting 
the law in a manner that may be driven more by pragmatism than by doctrinal 
rigor. 
Finally, the expanded role for non-state law has been justified, somewhat 
ironically, with an interest in strengthening state courts and their role in 
international commercial litigation.96 The hope is that state courts become more 
attractive vis-à-vis arbitration if they allow, as does arbitration, the choice of 
non-state law. Indeed, there would be many advantages to a situation in which 
state courts played a greater role, both in terms of development of commercial 
law through precedent, and in terms of legitimacy of adjudication. At present, 
state courts seem all too willing to defer commercial law to arbitration; a real 
competition does not seem to take place.97 It seems doubtful whether parties will 
flock to state courts if they can choose non-state law. Morevoer, it seems 
                                                        
93 Saumier (n 16) 542; but see Symeonides (n 60) 894. 
94 See now the contributions in Walter Mattli and Thomas Dietz (eds), International 
Arbitration and Global Governance: Contending Theories and Evidence (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
95 What follows is a quote from an email by Matthias Scherer; I am much obliged for 
his expert advice. 
96 Gama and Saumier (n 3) 52-53. 
97 See Ralf Michaels, ‘Roles and Role Perceptions of International Arbitrators’ in 
Mattli and Dietz (n 94) sub 2)c). 
questionable whether state courts should really become more like arbitrators in 
order to compete better. 
C. The Process 
Positions on argumentative position are one thing; attention to needs and practice is 
another. This signifies the most puzzling element about the Hague Principles. From 
all one can see, the decision to allow for the choice of non-state law was taken not in 
response to requests from outside, but on the basis of the assessment by members 
of the Working Group on what would, in their view be the best law. Such a process 
of lawmaking, be it in soft law or in hard law, is always problematic, simply because 
the drafters’ convictions are not tested. It is a danger already in negotiations for 
treaties, because negotiators are often more willing to move the law forward than 
their constituents. The danger is enhanced where law is made in a soft law process, 
with no check on the negotiators from their governments at all. As a consequence, 
drafters end up with what is in effect a subjective view on how the law should be, 
but formulated and promulgated in the form of law. 
Strikingly, Article 3 was not drafted in ignorance of existing laws or legal practice. 
The drafters were by no means unaware of the fact that state courts do not allow for 
the choice of non-state law, and parties very rarely show an interest in the choice of 
non-state law even in arbitration. Instead of concluding that allowing such a choice 
would be unnecessary, the Working Group came to the exact opposite conclusion: if 
parties and states do not yet opt for such choice, they must be educated to do so. For 
example, one member of the Drafting group explicitly suggests that the only 
plausible reasons why the Inter-American Convention has not been adopted by 
more countries are lack of information and inherent conservatism.98 He expresses 
the hope that the new Hague Principles can overcome both of these, without 
explaining why or how.99 Similarly, another member of the Drafting group hopes 
that the Hague Principles can overcome the uncertainty which she believes alone 
keeps practitioners from selecting the UPICC and can therefore ‘provide the impetus 
needed for the successful deployment of the UPICC.’100 Elsewhere, she and another 
member are even more explicit. They believe the reason non-state law is not chosen 
is that parties avoid the risk of uncertainty about its content, and without allowing 
for the choice before state courts, no system of precedent will build that can 
enhance certainty.101 But what they call a vicious cycle is not broken by making non-
state law available (as experience with the CISG shows) but only by providing 
                                                        
98 José Antonio Moreno Rodríguez, Contracts and Non-State Law in Latin America’ 
(2011) 16 Uniform Law Review 877, 881-2, 888. 
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100 Saumier (n 16) 535. 
101 Gama and Saumier (n 3) 64-5. 
incentives to choose it. All in all, the lack of interest by states and parties is 
explained away as the consequence of ignorance and conservatism. Whether parties 
or states will want to be educated by legal codes appears rather doubtful. 
VI. Conclusion 
Debates on whether non-state law can be chosen frequently focus on matters of 
legal theory (the definition of “law”), autonomy (the extent to which parties should 
be able to determine their respective rights and obligations) and legitimacy 
(whether law made by a Working Group can be as legitimate as law that has gone 
through a democratic process). In this article, I have deliberately refrained from 
joining the discussion with arguments on these issues. Instead I have tried to show 
that allowing the choice of non-state law responds to few existing needs, while 
necessarily running into a number of practical problems. 
It is not certain that Article 3 will fail for these reasons. Perhaps, official reaction will 
be more positive than it has been with regard to earlier attempts to allow the choice 
of non-state law. The Principles have little to teach for systems that already accept 
party autonomy, and systems that have refused to allow for the choice of non-state 
law like EU law are unlikely to change in view of a new attempt to integrate them.102 
Arbitrators are unlikely to find the restrictive criteria in Article 3 attractive. 
However, Latin American countries may view the Hague Principles as a model for 
the introduction of party autonomy.103 They would then move immediately from a 
situation in which party choice is barred altogether to one in which it can cover even 
to non-state law. If indeed that is the modern solution, then those countries now 
have their chance to be really modern.  
But such success does not seem likely. Article 3 responds to a need that is not really 
there. Procedurally, it was drafted from an academic perspective of education: 
because there is not yet interest in allowing the choice of non-state law, such 
interest must be created. Substantively, the rule does this in a manner that is, due to 
interference by the Special Commission, half-hearted, internally incoherent and 
hard to manage. All of these are reasons that not only make Article 3 unattractive; 
they also make it more than likely that Article 3 will have little impact. The Hague 
Principles will likely expand the list of projects attempting, and failing, to push the 
choice of non-state law forward. Those who wait for a revolution in choice of law for 
contracts must, in all likelihood, wait longer. 
Should one deplore this? Would the world be a better place if parties could choose 
non-state law before state courts? Would it be good for courts in their competition 
with arbitrators?104 I doubt this, but here I voice no strong opinion either way. 
Ultimately, it seems that whether non-state law can or cannot be chosen will have 
                                                        
102 See also Lando (n 35) 309. 
103 On the Paraguayan legislative initiative, see n 99. See also, more generally, José 
Antonio Moreno Rodríguez, ‘Los contratos y La Haya: ¿Ancla al pasado o puente al 
futuro? (2010) 15 Revista Brasileira de Direito Constitucional 125. 
104 Gama and Saumier (n 3) 52-53. 
fairly little impact on transnational contracts. What matters is that parties can 
choose a state law as a comprehensive framework to give their transaction 
predictability. What matters also is the scope of mandatory rules that limit such 
freedom. All of these are issues that the Hague Principles take up in other 
provisions. Non-state law has a significant role to play in this context—usages 
influence contract interpretation, transnational notions of law may provide a 
transnational background law. Whether non-state law can be chosen as applicable 
law or not is, however, in comparison quite irrelevant.105  
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